I checked 7 public opinion journals on Tuesday, March 24, 2026 using the Crossref API. For the period March 17 to March 23, I found 10 new paper(s) in 3 journal(s).

International Journal of Public Opinion Research

WAPOR News 2025
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Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology

HE SAID, SHE SAID: GENDER-OF-INTERVIEWER EFFECTS AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERVIEWERS’ GENDER ATTITUDES IN THE HUNGARIAN ESS ROUND 11
Ádåm Stefkovics, Vera Messing
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The measurement of gender attitudes in face-to-face surveys can be problematic due to gender of interviewer effects. When dealing with sensitive gender-related questions, respondents may downplay their genuine beliefs to avoid potential negative judgment from an interviewer of a particular gender or they may emphatically align their responses with perceived socially accepted opinions. In this study, we examine direct gender of interviewer effects and the interaction between the respondents’ and the interviewers’ gender. In addition, we extend prior studies by asking whether the interviewers’ own gender attitudes are associated with the respondents’ attitudes. We use the 11th round of the European Social Survey in Hungary, which contained a module on gender attitudes. In a unique setting, interviewers were asked to answer the same survey, resulting in 1,548 interviewer-respondent dyads available for analysis. The results of the multilevel models suggest no direct effects of the gender of the interviewer and weak interaction effects across different types of attitudes. However, the interviewer’s gender attitudes strongly and positively predicted the respondent’s same attitudes in many cases. We recommend that future face-to-face survey research control for some key attitudinal characteristics of the interviewer and focus on objectivity and self-expression during interviewer training.
Transcribing and Coding Voice Answers Obtained in Web Surveys: Comparing Three Leading Automatic Speech Recognition Tools
Melanie Revilla, Carlos Ochoa, Jan Karem Höhne, Mick P Couper
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With the rise of smartphone use in web surveys, voice or oral answers have become a promising methodology for collecting rich data. Voice answers present both opportunities and challenges. This study addresses two of these challenges—labor-intensive manual transcription and coding of responses. We compare the transcription performance of three leading Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) tools—Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API, OpenAI Whisper, and Vosk—using voice answers collected from an open-ended question on nursing home transparency that was administered in an opt-in online panel in Spain. Additionally, we evaluate the efficiency and quality of coding these transcriptions using human coders and GPT-4o, a Large Language Model (LLM) developed by OpenAI. We found that each of the ASR tools has distinct merits and limits. Google sometimes fails to provide transcriptions, Whisper produces hallucinations (false transcriptions), and Vosk has clarity issues and high rates of incorrect words. Human and LLM-based coding also differ significantly. Thus, we recommend using several ASR tools for voice answer transcription and implementing human as well as LLM-based coding, as the latter offers additional information at minimal added cost.

Public Opinion Quarterly

Mind the Gap: Partisan Bias in Justifying Political Violence in the United States
Lars Erik Berntzen, Cornelius Cappelen, Lilliana Mason, Tor MidtbĂž
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Political polarization in America has intensified beyond mere disagreement to what scholars characterize as sectarianism—a condition where partisan identity fundamentally shapes moral judgments. A key marker of sectarianism is asymmetric moral standards for violence, where aggression against political opponents is considered more justified than identical violence targeting one’s own group. Using a survey experiment featuring a realistic political rally scenario, we find compelling evidence in support of such sectarianism: partisan bias in the US extends to evaluations of political violence. By manipulating the partisan affiliations of perpetrators and targets, as well as provocation severity, we find that both Democrats and Republicans exhibit substantial and symmetrical partisan bias. This double standard is particularly pronounced among strong partisans, who are nearly three times more likely to justify violence against the opposition than violence targeting their own party. These results extend sectarianism theory beyond policy preferences to physical violence, suggesting that partisan identity now functions as a powerful perceptual filter that can legitimize political aggression when directed at opponents.
Media Trust in the Americas, 2008–2023
Jessica R Collier
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Concerns about media trust are especially salient given increased attention to issues of information quality and possible ramifications for countries and governments globally. In this Trends article, I use AmericasBarometer survey data to analyze media trust in North, South, and Central America, and the Caribbean from 2008 to 2023, reporting differences in trust based on each country. I plot trends in media trust across countries based on macro-level indicators of the media environment such as political system, perceived press freedom, and trust in elections. Finally, I present trends in media trust based on attention to news and political interest, individual factors that are influential to understanding media trust. Overall, downward trends in media trust are documented across countries and political and media systems.
How to Estimate Public Support for Political Violence and Why It Matters: Impact of Sampling, Engagement Checks, and Question Phrasing
Robert A Pape, Christopher G Price
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What is the true level of support for political violence in the United States? The answer to this question is extremely important to understanding the level of threat to American democracy, as well as how best to respond. Critics have argued that previous works by political scientists have drastically overstated the level of support for political violence, by 600 percent or more, due to disengaged respondents and poor question wording in surveys. Using probability panels, we conduct survey experiments to understand the impact of survey sampling methodology, respondent engagement, and question wording on the reported support for political violence in the United States. We find that disengagement is far less prevalent in probability panels, and that the effects of disengagement and question wording are less pronounced than in opt-in panels used by critics. Accordingly, policymakers and the general public have valid concerns about the magnitude of public support for violence.
Lost in Words: Framing Effects on Public Willingness to Fight
Ding-Yi Lai, Chu-Ling Tseng, Wen-Cheng Fu, Wen-Chin Wu
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Mobilizing citizens for defense is crucial in international conflicts, as demonstrated by recent events such as the Russia–Ukraine War in 2022. These conflicts highlight the critical importance of citizens’ willingness to fight. However, existing research, including that using the standard question in the World Values Survey (WVS), often overlooks a significant framing issue in measuring this willingness. This study addresses these gaps through theoretical and methodological perspectives. We argue that the way survey questions are framed can significantly influence responses. In particular, a value frame suggesting patriotism would increase willingness to fight, while a cost frame implying war-related costs would decrease it. Through conducting experimental surveys with varied wording on willingness to fight in Taiwan in 2024, we assess the impact of these different frames embedded in question wordings on responses to willingness to fight between two distinct groups: civilians and military recruits. We also measure the extent of social desirability bias that the value frame may induce. We have two major findings. First, the value frame would induce more willingness to fight while the cost frame dampens it. Second, military recruits display a lower willingness to fight compared to civilians, likely due to their greater awareness of the costs associated with war. This study emphasizes the need for carefully designed surveys and suggests alternative strategies of political communication to enhance the public willingness to fight among various groups, ensuring more accurate assessments of national defense preparedness.
You’re Making Us Look Bad: Can Partisan Embarrassment Dampen Partisanship and Polarization?
Elizabeth C Connors, Taylor N Carlson, Steven W Webster
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Partisan elites and members of the public often have attitudes or engage in behavior that could embarrass copartisans. We examine this occurrence—what we call partisan embarrassment—by investigating how much partisans report feeling this embarrassment, what types of scenarios embarrass partisans, what types of partisans feel this embarrassment, and what the political ramifications of partisan embarrassment could be. We expect that when a copartisan engages in embarrassing behavior, copartisans will want to distance themselves from their party to preserve their own status. We find that about 53.9 percent of American partisans experience partisan embarrassment, but it is highly variable across individuals and scenarios and has limited influence on partisanship, polarization, private or public in-party support, or views about party competence. Consistent with work highlighting the importance and stability of partisan attachments, our findings suggest that partisans are unlikely to punish their party, even when it embarrasses them.
Conditioning Public Opinion Perceptions by “Survey Methods 101”: Informing, Engaging, and Motivating Individuals for Critical Processing of Public Opinion Polls
Ozan Kuru
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Can we train individuals on survey methods to boost their critical processing of public opinion evidence? While polls are one of the most systematic and scientific methods for measuring and communicating public opinion, they face credibility challenges, such as decreasing public trust, the prevalence of straw and misinformation polls, and individuals’ biased dismissal of polls that deliver unfavorable results. These issues manifest and fuel misperceptions, misinformation, and polarization in public opinion, pollsters, and the media. We designed and tested a novel strategy to mitigate these challenges collectively, indirectly, and nonconfrontationally via preemptive educative interventions that cultivate polling literacy. Integrating components from pedagogical and persuasion theories, three interventions are designed to (1) inform (passive literacy), (2) inform and engage (active literacy), and (3) inform, engage, and motivate (psychological inoculation) individuals. The effects of these interventions were evaluated and compared in an extensive, preregistered, longitudinal experiment. In Wave 1, trainees were exposed to one of the interventions or a control training. In Wave 2, participants viewed polls with either poor or robust methodology, tested across different poll results (majority supporting vs. opposing; ecological validity) and issues (COVID-19 vaccines and artificial intelligence; conceptual replication), and then evaluated polling evidence. Results showed that inoculation was particularly effective. Participants’ education levels and science literacy levels conditioned various intervention effects. The theoretical implications of this novel pathway to conditioning public opinion and practical insights are discussed with a qualitative review and recommendations for existing public education efforts.
Paying It Forward: Generalized Reciprocity in Mass Opinion on Foreign Aid
Joonbum Bae, Changkeun Lee
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Does providing American vaccines overseas improve views of the United States? Do beneficiaries of donated shots change their opinions on foreign aid? Can the example of the United States providing aid lead to higher support for international assistance in other nations? Utilizing original panel data from a two-wave survey fielded in South Korea in 2021 and 2022, this paper finds no evidence that American shots, whether donated or purchased, lead to more positive views of the United States. However, we document a “pay it forward effect,” where recipients of donated COVID-19 vaccines from the United States were more likely to pass on the generosity by supporting Korean vaccine aid to other countries in need. Information that the United States was supplying assistance to developing countries also made it more likely that vaccinated South Koreans would support their government donating vaccines abroad. This study provides evidence of second-order effects of vaccine aid that can benefit American interests by facilitating the timely distribution of vaccines across the globe, even when it does not improve the donor’s image. The results highlight the role foreign aid can play in furthering international cooperation and call for broader criteria when evaluating its effect.