This primer provides a systematic introduction to proportional representation (PR) electoral systems for scholars and students unfamiliar with their mechanics and political consequences. PR is now used for legislative elections in approximately 118 countries, making it the worldâs most common family of electoral systems. However, its formal structure and political effects are often poorly understood outside specialist communities. The primer covers the main families of apportionment algorithms (quota, divisor, and ranked-choice methods), the principal types of PR electoral systems (list PR, STV, mixed, and semi-proportional), and their key structural components, including district magnitude, thresholds, measures of disproportionality, volatility, and the effective number of parties. It surveys major empirical regularities, including Duvergerâs Law, the impact of district magnitude on party fragmentation, womenâs and minority representation, voter turnout, and coalition formation, before turning to paradoxes and problems, including apportionment paradoxes and the BalinskiâYoung impossibility theorem, STV Non-Monotonicity and the No-Show paradox, spoilers and ballot-position primacy effects in list PR, and overhang seats and decoy parties in mixed compensatory systems. The primer concludes that every apportionment method is formally flawed, that institutional parameters interact with strategic behavior in ways that frequently produce unexpected outcomes, and that the empirical regularities anchoring the field rest on identification strategies that are vulnerable to the endogeneity of electoral institutions. A Glossary of key concepts is included as an Appendix.